Maxwell, Brett J. Wilson, William W. Dahl, Bruce L.
Abstract
A number of challenges exist for genetically modified (GM) crop development at the production level. Contract strategies can resolve these challenges. Contracts can be designed to induce legal adoption of GM wheat by varying technology fees, violation detection, and penalties. The primary objective of this research is to analyze contracting strategies to determine terms to minimize technology agreement violation and to induce legal adoption of GM wheat. A simulation model of a crop budget for Hard Red Spring wheat was developed. Results illustrate that contracts can be designed to induce desired behavior. Technology fee, probability of detection, and the level of non-GM premium were the most notable factors influencing adoption decisions.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by North Dakota State University, Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics in its series Agribusiness & Applied Economics Report with number
23639.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: