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The Political Economy Of Tariffs In U.S. Food Manufacturing

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  • Pagoulatos, Emilio
  • Lopez, Rigoberto A.

Abstract

This paper estimates a simple model of tariff formation for U.S. food manufacturing industries based on a political market for protection. Findings indicate that higher tariffs tend to be associated with declining, low-skill, and labor-intensive industries, who actively lobby by supporting particular congressional candidates in elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Pagoulatos, Emilio & Lopez, Rigoberto A., 1991. "The Political Economy Of Tariffs In U.S. Food Manufacturing," 1991 Annual Meeting, August 4-7, Manhattan, Kansas 271068, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea91:271068
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.271068
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Godek, Paul E, 1985. "Industry Structure and Redistribution through Trade Restrictions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(3), pages 687-703, October.
    2. Ronald S. Saunders, 1980. "The Political Economy of Effective Tariff Protection in Canada's Manufacturing Sector," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 13(2), pages 340-348, May.
    3. Robert D. Tollison, 1982. "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602, November.
    4. Baldwin, Robert E, 1989. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 119-135, Fall.
    5. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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