This note considers Hotelling’s (1929) model of locational choices by two firms and subsequent price competition in a setting where atomistic consumers locate first. It is shown that any equilibrium in pure strategies involves either one or two mass points with all surplus captured either by the consumers or by firms, respectively.
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Paper provided by Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics in its series ANUCBE School of Economics Working Papers with number
2004-444.
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