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Complete Solution of the Hotelling Problem: Equilibrium in Secure Strategies for the Price Subgame

Author

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  • Iskakov, M.

    (Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences RAS, Moscow, Russia)

  • Iskakov, A.

    (Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences RAS, Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

We study the classical problem of spatial competition between two players with linear transport costs proposed by (Hotelling, 1929). We employ the concept of the equilibrium in secure strategies (ESS). The reviewed definitions of the ESS and of the best secure response are presented. The set of the secure responses in the Hotelling game is obtained both in the case of elastic and inelastic demand. The complete solution of the two-stage location-price Hotelling game is given for the inelastic demand.

Suggested Citation

  • Iskakov, M. & Iskakov, A., 2012. "Complete Solution of the Hotelling Problem: Equilibrium in Secure Strategies for the Price Subgame," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 10-33.
    • Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2012:i:13:p:10-33
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    hotelling; product differentiation; equilibrium in secure strategies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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