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The Politics of Stabdization and Structural Adjustment

In: Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 1: The International Financial System

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  • Stephan Haggard
  • Robert Kaufman

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  • Stephan Haggard & Robert Kaufman, 1989. "The Politics of Stabdization and Structural Adjustment," NBER Chapters, in: Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 1: The International Financial System, pages 209-254, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:8991
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hibbs, Douglas A., 1977. "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 1467-1487, December.
    2. Ordeshook,Peter C., 1986. "Game Theory and Political Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521315937.
    3. Nelson, Joan M., 1984. "The political economy of stabilization: Commitment, capacity, and public response," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 12(10), pages 983-1006, October.
    4. Bienen, Henry S. & Gersovitz, Mark, 1985. "Economic stabilization, conditionality, and political stability," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(4), pages 729-754, October.
    5. Erich Weede, 1983. "The Impact of Democracy on Economic Growth: Some Evidence from Cross‐National Analysis," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 21-39, August.
    6. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, 1982. "Import Competition and Response," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number bhag82-1, July.
    7. Dick, G William, 1974. "Authoritarian versus Nonauthoritarian Approaches to Economic Development," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 817-827, July/Aug..
    8. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, 1982. "Introduction to "Import Competition and Response"," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 1-8, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Jeffrey Sachs & Harry Huizinga, 1987. "U.S. Commercial Banks and the Developing-Country Debt Crisis," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 18(2), pages 555-606.
    10. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
    11. Eaton, Jonathan & Taylor, Lance, 1986. "Developing country finance and debt," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 209-265, June.
    12. Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1985. "External Debt and Macroeconomic Performance in Latin America and East Asia," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 16(2), pages 523-573.
    13. Rogowski, Ronald, 1987. "Trade and the variety of democratic institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 203-223, April.
    14. Fields, Gary S, 1984. "Employment, Income Distribution and Economic Growth in Seven Small Open Economies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(373), pages 74-83, March.
    15. Lindbeck, Assar, 1976. "Stabilization Policy in Open Economies with Endogenous Politicians," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 1-19, May.
    16. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
    17. Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, 1976. "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 651-666.
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