Did Plant Patents Create the American Rose?
In: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity Revisited
AbstractThe Plant Patent Act of 1930 was the first step towards creating property rights for biological innovation: it introduced patent rights for asexually-propagated plants. This paper uses data on plant patents and registrations of new varieties to examine whether the Act encouraged innovation. Nearly half of all plant patents between 1931 and 1970 were for roses. Large commercial nurseries, which began to build mass hybridization programs in the 1940s, accounted for most of these patents, suggesting that the new intellectual property rights may have helped to encourage the development of a commercial rose breeding industry. Data on registrations of newly-created roses, however, yield no evidence of an increase in innovation: less than 20 percent of new roses were patented, European breeders continued to create most new roses, and there was no increase in the number of new varieties per year after 1931.
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- K0 - Law and Economics - - General
- N12 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
- O3 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
- Q0 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General
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- Petra Moser & Alessandra Voena, 2009.
"Compulsory Licensing - Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act,"
NBER Working Papers
15598, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Petra Moser & Alessandra Voena, 2012. "Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 396-427, February.
- Petra Moser & Alessandra Voena, 2010. "Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act," Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research 09-026, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Ryan L. Lampe & Petra Moser, 2009. "Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from the 19th-Century Sewing Machine Industry," NBER Working Papers 15061, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Popp David & Juhl Ted & Johnson Daniel K.N., 2004. "Time In Purgatory: Examining the Grant Lag for U.S. Patent Applications," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-45, November.
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