Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries
AbstractRecent scholarly literature explains the spread of in-house research labs during the early 20th century by pointing to the information problems involved in contracting for technology. We argue that these difficulties have been overemphasized and that in fact a substantial trade in patented inventions developed over the course of the 19th century, much of it the form of transactions conducted at arms-length through the market. This expansion of trade in technology made possible a growing division of labor, as inventors increasingly took advantage of their greater ability to sell of rights to patented technologies and focused their energy and resources on invention itself. Firms responded to the expansion of this trade by developing ways to to learn about and assess externally generated inventions. Although large firms were beginning to invest in their internal inventive capabilities, in doing so they faced many significant problems. They had to overcome resistance to contracts requiring employees to sign over patents to their employers, and they had to reduce the high turnover rates that made such requirements effectively unenforceable. The increased costs of inventive activity and the greater risks borne by independent inventors by the early 20th century helped firms make their case. But there was a lot of organizational learning to do. Hence where other scholars have emphasized the difficulties of contracting for technology in the market and the relative ease of integrating invention and production within the firm, we reverse the story. Economic actors at that time had a lot of experience contracting for new technological ideas in the market; what they had to spend a great deal of time and energy learning was managing creative individuals within the firm.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Historical Working Papers with number 0098.
Date of creation: Apr 1997
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Publication status: published as Learning By Doing in Firms, Markets, and Nations. Lamoreaux, Naomi R., Daniel M. G. Raff, and Peter Temin, eds., Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999, pp.19-57.
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- Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, 1999. "Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," NBER Chapters, in: Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms, and Countries, pages 19-60 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- O3 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights
- N0 - Economic History - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-TID-1998-08-31 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
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