The Political Economy of Federal Regulatory Activity: The Case of Water-Pollution Controls
In: Studies in Public Regulation
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- Stavins, Robert, 2005.
"The Effects of Vintage-Differentiated Environmental Regulation,"
Working Paper Series
rwp05-031, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Stavins, Robert, 2005. "The Effects of Vintage-Differentiated Environmental Regulation," Discussion Papers dp-05-12, Resources For the Future.
- Stavins, Robert & Keohane, Nathaniel & Revesz, Richard, 1997. "The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy," Discussion Papers dp-97-25, Resources For the Future.
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