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Introduction: two decades of structural reform and political change in Italy and Japan

In: The Politics of Structural Reforms

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  • Hideko Magara

Abstract

For countries undertaking economic or political reform the case of Italy and Japan is both highly instructive and sobering. The Politics of Structural Reforms reveals what Italy and Japan gained and lost through a series of social and industrial reforms in the 1990s and 2000s, and why the changes they made in their policies have had little impact in softening the recent economic crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Hideko Magara, 2013. "Introduction: two decades of structural reform and political change in Italy and Japan," Chapters, in: Hideko Magara & Stefano Sacchi (ed.), The Politics of Structural Reforms, chapter 1, pages 1-24, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14405_1
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