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Licensing of copyright works in a bargaining model

In: Handbook on the Economics of Copyright

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  • Richard Watt

Abstract

Featuring expert contributors from around the world, this book offers insight into the vital theoretical and practical aspects of the economics of copyright. Topics discussed include fair use, performers’ rights, copyright and trade, online music streaming, internet piracy, copyright and visual art markets, and open source publishing. In addition to in-depth coverage of these timely topics, the authors also offer insightful predictions and policy recommendations for the future.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Watt, 2014. "Licensing of copyright works in a bargaining model," Chapters, in: Richard Watt (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Copyright, chapter 6, pages 107-117, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14240_6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Morton I. Kamien & Yair Tauman, 1986. "Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(3), pages 471-491.
    2. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    3. Andrea Fosfuri & Esther Roca, 2004. "Optimal Licensing Strategy: Royalty or Fixed Fee?," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 3(1), pages 13-19, April.
    4. Wendy J. Gordon & Richard Watt (ed.), 2003. "The Economics of Copyright," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2998.
    5. Sen, Debapriya, 2005. "Fee versus royalty reconsidered," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 141-147, October.
    6. Richard Watt, 2010. "Revenue Sharing as Compensation for Copyright Holders," ICER Working Papers 23-2010, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    7. Wang, X. Henry, 1998. "Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 55-62, July.
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    Economics and Finance; Law - Academic;

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