Banking Concentration: Implications for Systemic Risk and Safety-net Design
In: Banking Market Structure and Monetary Policy
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This chapter was published in: Luis Antonio Ahumada & J. Rodrigo Fuentes & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series Editor) (ed.) Banking Market Structure and Monetary Policy, , chapter 13, pages 359-385, 2004.
This item is provided by Central Bank of Chile in its series Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series with number v07c13pp359-385.
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- Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 1996.
"Interbank lending and systemic risk,"
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 733-765.
- James, Christopher, 1991. " The Losses Realized in Bank Failures," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1223-42, September.
- Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983.
"Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "The prudential regulation of banks," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9539, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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