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Ori Zax

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First Name:Ori
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Last Name:Zax
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RePEc Short-ID:pza266
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Research output

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Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. zax, ori, 2014. "Human capital and the probability of divorce," MPRA Paper 60973, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Waldman, Michael & Zax, Ori, 2014. "An exploration of the promotion signaling distortion," MPRA Paper 60656, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Articles

  1. Oded Hochman & Ori Zax, 2023. "Production in Urban Environments," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 69(1), pages 61-68.
  2. Yanay Farja & Avi Tillman & Ori Zax, 2022. "The Gender Gap: Looking at the Entire Distribution," Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, , vol. 34(1), pages 51-68, January.
  3. Chen Cohen & Ori Zax, 2022. "Human capital acquisition as a signaling device in promotion competition," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(2), pages 550-566, May.
  4. Ori Zax, 2020. "Human capital acquisition as a competitive response to the promotion distortion," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(3), pages 496-509, July.
  5. Michael Waldman & Ori Zax, 2020. "Promotion Signaling and Human Capital Investments," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 125-155, February.
  6. Yanay Farja & Ori Zax, 2020. "Efficiency Wages with Endogenous Monitoring," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(1), pages 248-261.
  7. David Wettstein & Ori Zax, 2018. "Promotion Policies of Workers who Observe their Ability," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(4), pages 2509-2514.
  8. Ori Zax, 2017. "Promotion Policies at Different Firms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(2), pages 1045-1054.
  9. Ori Zax, 2016. "Why Do Women Study So Much? The Role of Signaling and Work Commitment," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(2), pages 1185-1193.
  10. Michael Waldman & Ori Zax, 2016. "An Exploration of the Promotion Signaling Distortion," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(1), pages 119-149.
  11. Ori Zax, 2015. "Human Capital And The Probability Of Divorce," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(S1), pages 111-134, December.
  12. Ori Zax & Mosi Rosenboim & Tal Shavit, 2014. "Effects of Expected Effort on Females in the Labor Market," Forum for Social Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(2), pages 107-122, August.
  13. Ori Zax, 2012. "Promotion Policy and Firm Size," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 3347-3356.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Waldman, Michael & Zax, Ori, 2014. "An exploration of the promotion signaling distortion," MPRA Paper 60656, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Waldman, Michael, 2016. "The dual avenues of labor market signaling," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 120-134.
    2. Dato, Simon & Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2016. "Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 273-300.
    3. Jens MohrenweiserBy & Gabriele Wydra-Somaggio & Thomas Zwick, 2020. "Information advantages of training employers despite credible training certificates," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 651-671.
    4. Ekinci, Emre, 2022. "Employee entrepreneurship and signaling role of corporate venturing decisions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    5. Jed DeVaro & Oliver Gürtler, 2020. "Strategic shirking in competitive labor markets: A general model of multi‐task promotion tournaments with employer learning," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 335-376, April.
    6. Mohrenweiser, Jens & Wydra-Sommaggio, Gaby & Zwick, Thomas, 2015. "Work-related ability as source of information advantages of training employers," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-057, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    7. Jed DeVaro & Suman Ghosh & Cindy Zoghi, 2018. "Job Characteristics and Labor Market Discrimination in Promotions," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 389-434, July.
    8. Ferreira, Daniel & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2017. "Adverse Selection and Assortative Matching in Labor Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 11869, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Ori Zax, 2020. "Human capital acquisition as a competitive response to the promotion distortion," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(3), pages 496-509, July.
    10. Spencer Bastani & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2023. "Overconfidence and Gender Equality in the Labor Market," CESifo Working Paper Series 10339, CESifo.
    11. Simon Dato & Andreas Grunewald & Matthias Kräkel, 2021. "Worker visibility and firms' retention policies," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 168-202, February.
    12. Chen Cohen & Ori Zax, 2022. "Human capital acquisition as a signaling device in promotion competition," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(2), pages 550-566, May.
    13. David Wettstein & Ori Zax, 2018. "Promotion Policies of Workers who Observe their Ability," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(4), pages 2509-2514.
    14. Ori Zax, 2017. "Promotion Policies at Different Firms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(2), pages 1045-1054.
    15. Daniel Ferreira & Radoslawa Nikolowa, 2023. "Talent Discovery and Poaching Under Asymmetric Information," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(649), pages 201-234.

Articles

  1. Ori Zax, 2020. "Human capital acquisition as a competitive response to the promotion distortion," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(3), pages 496-509, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Chen Cohen & Ori Zax, 2022. "Human capital acquisition as a signaling device in promotion competition," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(2), pages 550-566, May.

  2. Michael Waldman & Ori Zax, 2020. "Promotion Signaling and Human Capital Investments," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 125-155, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Oliver Gürtler & Lennart Struth, 2021. "Do Workers Benefit from Wage Transparency Rules?," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 105, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    2. Tom Ahn & Jason Niven & Andrew Veilleux, 2021. "How long have you been waiting? Explaining the role of irrelevant information in the promotion of U.S. Navy officers," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 41(2), pages 604-614.
    3. Ori Zax, 2020. "Human capital acquisition as a competitive response to the promotion distortion," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(3), pages 496-509, July.
    4. Chen Cohen & Ori Zax, 2022. "Human capital acquisition as a signaling device in promotion competition," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(2), pages 550-566, May.
    5. Deutscher, Christian & Gürtler, Marc & Gürtler, Oliver & DeVaro, Jed, 2020. "Firm choice and career success - theory and evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    6. Tobias Hiller, 2023. "Training, Abilities and the Structure of Teams," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-8, May.

  3. David Wettstein & Ori Zax, 2018. "Promotion Policies of Workers who Observe their Ability," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(4), pages 2509-2514.

    Cited by:

    1. Ori Zax, 2020. "Human capital acquisition as a competitive response to the promotion distortion," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(3), pages 496-509, July.
    2. Chen Cohen & Ori Zax, 2022. "Human capital acquisition as a signaling device in promotion competition," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(2), pages 550-566, May.

  4. Ori Zax, 2017. "Promotion Policies at Different Firms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(2), pages 1045-1054.

    Cited by:

    1. David Wettstein & Ori Zax, 2018. "Promotion Policies of Workers who Observe their Ability," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(4), pages 2509-2514.

  5. Ori Zax, 2016. "Why Do Women Study So Much? The Role of Signaling and Work Commitment," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(2), pages 1185-1193.

    Cited by:

    1. Yanay Farja & Avi Tillman & Ori Zax, 2022. "The Gender Gap: Looking at the Entire Distribution," Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, , vol. 34(1), pages 51-68, January.

  6. Michael Waldman & Ori Zax, 2016. "An Exploration of the Promotion Signaling Distortion," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(1), pages 119-149.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Ori Zax & Mosi Rosenboim & Tal Shavit, 2014. "Effects of Expected Effort on Females in the Labor Market," Forum for Social Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(2), pages 107-122, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Ori Zax, 2016. "Why Do Women Study So Much? The Role of Signaling and Work Commitment," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(2), pages 1185-1193.

  8. Ori Zax, 2012. "Promotion Policy and Firm Size," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 3347-3356.

    Cited by:

    1. Ori Zax, 2020. "Human capital acquisition as a competitive response to the promotion distortion," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(3), pages 496-509, July.
    2. David Wettstein & Ori Zax, 2018. "Promotion Policies of Workers who Observe their Ability," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(4), pages 2509-2514.
    3. Ori Zax, 2017. "Promotion Policies at Different Firms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(2), pages 1045-1054.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (1) 2015-01-14

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