Promotion Policy and Firm Size
AbstractIn contrast to the predictions of conventional economic theory, it is well documented that similar workers receive wages positively correlated with the size of the firm employing them. To explain these findings we augment the Waldman (1984) framework by adding a size variable and construct a dynamic model of promotion and obtain an equilibrium with a positive correlation between firm size and wages.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 32 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Contact details of provider:
Firm size and wages; promotion decisions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
- J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Thomas Cooley & Ramon Marimon & Vicenzo Quadrini, 1999.
"Aggregate consequences of limited contract enforceability,"
Economics Working Papers
843, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2003.
- Thomas Cooley & Ramon Marimon & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2004. "Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(4), pages 817-847, August.
- Thomas Cooley & Ramon Marimon & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2003. "Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability," Working Papers 1, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Cooley, Thomas F & Marimon, Ramon & Quadrini, Vincenzo, 2004. "Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability," CEPR Discussion Papers 4173, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Thomas Cooley & Ramon Marimon & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2003. "Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability," NBER Working Papers 10132, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lu�s M B Cabral & Jos� Mata, 2003.
"On the Evolution of the Firm Size Distribution: Facts and Theory,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1075-1090, September.
- Cabral, Luís M B & Mata, José, 2001. "On the Evolution of the Firm Size Distribution: Facts and Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 3045, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Postel-Vinay, Fabien & Robin, Jean-Marc, 2002.
"Equilibrium Wage Dispersion with Worker and Employer Heterogeneity,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3548, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2002. "Equilibrium Wage Dispersion with Worker and Employer Heterogeneity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2295-2350, November.
- Postel-Vinay, F. & Robin, J.-M., 2002. "Equilibrium wage dispersion with worker and employer heterogeneity," Open Access publications from University College London http://discovery.ucl.ac.u, University College London.
- repec:ner:sciepo:info:hdl:2441/c8dmi8nm4pdjkuc9g8grh35j2 is not listed on IDEAS
- Michael Waldman, 1983.
"Job Assignments, Signalling nad Efficiency,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
286, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Paolo Angelini & Andrea Generale, 2008. "On the Evolution of Firm Size Distributions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 426-38, March.
- Waldman, Michael, 1984. "Worker Allocation, Hierarchies and the Wage Distribution," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 95-109, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.