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Hometown-Specific Bargaining Power In An Experimental Market In China

Author

Listed:
  • XIANGDONG QIN

    (Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 1954 Huashan Rd, Shanghai, 200030, P. R. China)

  • JUNYI SHEN

    (��Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, 2-1 Rokkodai, Nada, Kobe 657-8501, Japan)

  • KEN-ICHI SHIMOMURA

    (��Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, 2-1 Rokkodai, Nada, Kobe 657-8501, Japan)

  • TAKEHIKO YAMATO

    (��Department of Industrial Engineering and Economics, School of Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2-12-1 Ookayama, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 152-8552, Japan)

Abstract

We conducted a market experiment in China to examine potential effects of subjects’ hometowns on their behaviors as well as potential differences between team and individual trades. We observed that group size affected bargaining power and subsequently payoffs in different directions according to where the subjects were from. In particular, teamwork strengthened the bargaining power of the subjects from coastal areas but weakened that of the subjects from inland areas when commodity exchanges were conducted between subjects from different areas. This finding suggests that it is important to take one’s hometown into account when comparing economic behavior or decision-making between teams and individuals, especially in the countries or regions where hometown diversity plays a central role in explaining differences in business management and local market performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiangdong Qin & Junyi Shen & Ken-Ichi Shimomura & Takehiko Yamato, 2022. "Hometown-Specific Bargaining Power In An Experimental Market In China," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 67(04), pages 1225-1252, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:serxxx:v:67:y:2022:i:04:n:s0217590818500030
    DOI: 10.1142/S0217590818500030
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary Charness & Matthias Sutter, 2012. "Groups Make Better Self-Interested Decisions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 26(3), pages 157-176, Summer.
    2. Cason, Timothy N & Mui, Vai-Lam, 1997. "A Laboratory Study of Group Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(444), pages 1465-1483, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Emiko Fukuda & Shuhei Sato & Junyi Shen & Ken-Ichi Shimomura & Takehiko Yamato, 2020. "Walrasian Dynamics with Endowment Changes: The Gale Example in a Laboratory Market Experiment," Discussion Paper Series DP2020-20, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, revised Apr 2021.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Hometown; market experiment; team trade; individual trade; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies

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