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OTC Clearing Arrangements for Bank Systemic Risk Regulation: A Simulation Approach

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  • OLGA LEWANDOWSKA

Abstract

Based on a simulation approach, this paper compares different over‐the‐counter (OTC) clearing models regarding their netting efficiency and loss‐concentration implications. The results indicate that the mandatory clearing of all standardized OTC derivatives by a Central Counterparty (CCP) propagated by regulators would significantly decrease systemic risk as compared to existing clearing arrangements only if the multilateral netting benefits of the CCP and loss mutualization are fully attained. Therefore, regulators have to ensure that there is a critical mass of asset classes under mandatory clearing, that broad market participation in the CCP is enabled, and that there is an appropriate client asset protection regime.

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  • Olga Lewandowska, 2015. "OTC Clearing Arrangements for Bank Systemic Risk Regulation: A Simulation Approach," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(6), pages 1177-1203, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:47:y:2015:i:6:p:1177-1203
    DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.12241
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    1. Bellia, Mario & Panzica, Roberto & Pelizzon, Loriana & Peltonen, Tuomas A., 2017. "The demand for central clearing: to clear or not to clear, that is the question," ESRB Working Paper Series 62, European Systemic Risk Board.
    2. Christian Kubitza & Loriana Pelizzon & Mila Getmansky Sherman, 2021. "Loss Sharing in Central Clearinghouses: Winners and Losers," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 066, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    3. Kubitza, Christian & Pelizzon, Loriana & Getmansky, Mila, 2018. "The pitfalls of central clearing in the presence of systematic risk," ICIR Working Paper Series 31/18, Goethe University Frankfurt, International Center for Insurance Regulation (ICIR).
    4. Berndsen, Ron, 2020. "Five Fundamental Questions on Central Counterparties," Other publications TiSEM 1f3bd844-92ab-4104-8f57-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Injun Hwang & Baeho Kim, 2022. "A systemic change of measure from central clearing," Journal of Futures Markets, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(9), pages 1738-1754, September.
    6. Paolo Barucca & Marco Bardoscia & Fabio Caccioli & Marco D'Errico & Gabriele Visentin & Guido Caldarelli & Stefano Battiston, 2020. "Network valuation in financial systems," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 1181-1204, October.
    7. Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Pelizzon, Loriana, 2016. ""Predatory" margins and the regulation and supervision of central counterparty clearing houses (CCPs)," SAFE White Paper Series 41, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    8. Dietrich Domanski & Leonardo Gambacorta & Cristina Picillo, 2015. "Central clearing: trends and current issues," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, December.

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