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Pairwise Stable Matching in Large Economies

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  • Michael Greinecker
  • Christopher Kah

Abstract

We formulate a stability notion for two‐sided pairwise matching problems with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Matchings are formulated as joint distributions over the characteristics of the populations to be matched. Spaces of characteristics can be high‐dimensional and need not be compact. Stable matchings exist with and without transfers, and stable matchings correspond precisely to limits of stable matchings for finite‐agent models. We can embed existing continuum matching models and stability notions with transferable utility as special cases of our model and stability notion. In contrast to finite‐agent matching models, stable matchings exist under a general class of externalities.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Greinecker & Christopher Kah, 2021. "Pairwise Stable Matching in Large Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(6), pages 2929-2974, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:89:y:2021:i:6:p:2929-2974
    DOI: 10.3982/ECTA16228
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 2021. "Mating Markets," Working Papers 2021-016, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    4. Chao Huang, 2022. "Two-sided matching with firms' complementary preferences," Papers 2205.05599, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    5. Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Scott Duke Kominers & Ran I. Shorrer, 2019. "To Infinity and Beyond: A General Framework for Scaling Economic Theories," Papers 1906.10333, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.

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