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Informational spillovers and the coordination of speculative investments

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  • Francisco M. González

Abstract

. The influence of informational spillovers on the entrepreneur's incentive to undertake reversible investment opportunities is considered. It is shown how investment activity can be driven by the influence that the prospect of social learning has on the option value of investment. In this context, episodes of high investment activity result from a speculative motive, and the expected short‐run profitability of new investment opportunities may inadequately reflect the entrepreneurs’ incentive to invest. Effets de débordement informationnel et coordination d’investissements spéculatifs. Ce mémoire examine l’impact des effets de débordement informationnel sur l’incitation de l’entrepreneur à s’engager dans des opportunités d’investissement réversible. On montre comment l’activité d’investissement peut être influencée par la possibilité que l’apprentissage social ait un impact sur la valeur d’option de l’investissement. Dans ce contexte, des épisodes de fortes activités d’investissement sont déclenchés par un motif de spéculation, et la profitabilité anticipée à court terme pour les nouvelles possibilités d’investissement peut ne pas refléter de manière adéquate l’incitation à investir de l’entrepreneur.

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  • Francisco M. González, 2004. "Informational spillovers and the coordination of speculative investments," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(1), pages 140-148, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:37:y:2004:i:1:p:140-148
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0008-4085.2004.007_1.x
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