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The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy

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  • Tom S. Clark

Abstract

A major focus of judicial politics research has been the extent to which ideological divergence between the Court and Congress can explain variation in Supreme Court decision making. However, conflicting theoretical and empirical findings have given rise to a significant discrepancy in the scholarship. Building on evidence from interviews with Supreme Court justices and former law clerks, I develop a formal model of judicial‐congressional relations that incorporates judicial preferences for institutional legitimacy and the role of public opinion in congressional hostility towards the Supreme Court. An original dataset identifying all Court‐curbing legislation proposed between 1877 and 2006 is then used to assess the influence of congressional hostility on the Court's use of judicial review. The evidence indicates that public discontent with the Court, as mediated through congressional hostility, creates an incentive for the Court to exercise self‐restraint. When Congress is hostile, the Court uses judicial review to invalidate Acts of Congress less frequently than when Congress is not hostile towards the Court.

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  • Tom S. Clark, 2009. "The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(4), pages 971-989, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:53:y:2009:i:4:p:971-989
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00411.x
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    2. Monika Stachowiak-Kudła & Janusz Kudła, 2023. "Measuring the prestige of administrative courts," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 57(4), pages 3637-3662, August.
    3. Joshua B. Fischman, 2015. "Do the Justices Vote Like Policy Makers? Evidence from Scaling the Supreme Court with Interest Groups," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(S1), pages 269-293.
    4. Byungjun Yu & Saixing Zeng & Xiaohua Meng & Hanyang Ma & Daxin Sun, 2020. "Does natural environment prefer the right to the left? Governors' partisanship and corporate environmental performance," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 27(4), pages 1605-1616, July.
    5. Martin Andrew D. & Hazelton Morgan L.W., 2012. "What Political Science Can Contribute to the Study of Law," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2), pages 511-529, October.
    6. Karakas, Leyla D., 2017. "Political rents under alternative forms of judicial review," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 86-96.
    7. José Luis Castro-Montero & Edwin Alblas & Arthur Dyevre & Nicolas Lampach, 2018. "The Court of Justice and treaty revision: A case of strategic leniency?," European Union Politics, , vol. 19(4), pages 570-596, December.
    8. Nicolas Lampach & Arthur Dyevre, 2020. "Choosing for Europe: judicial incentives and legal integration in the European Union," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 65-86, August.
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    10. Stefanie A. Lindquist & Pamela C. Corley, 2011. "The Multiple-Stage Process of Judicial Review: Facial and As-Applied Constitutional Challenges to Legislation before the U.S. Supreme Court," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 467-502.
    11. Matthew D. Montgomery & Michael P. Fix & Justin T. Kingsland, 2021. "Rigid rules and slippery standards: How the nature of U.S. Supreme Court precedents influences subsequent state court treatments," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2894-2906, November.
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