IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/vrs/foeste/v23y2023i2p86-101n21.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Study on Loan Delinquency of the Self Help Group-Bank Linkage Programme in Rural Rajasthan

Author

Listed:
  • Bhatnagar Deepali

    (1 Amity University, Rajasthan, India)

  • Yadav Kajal

    (2 Amity University, Rajasthan, India)

Abstract

Providing the microfinance to rural women is the prime concern of the government at central and state level in which the best microfinance programme is the Self Help Group Bank Linkage Programme. However, the Delinquency rate of the SHGBLP loan is on the higher side. As, borrowers do not make their loan repayments on time.

Suggested Citation

  • Bhatnagar Deepali & Yadav Kajal, 2023. "A Study on Loan Delinquency of the Self Help Group-Bank Linkage Programme in Rural Rajasthan," Folia Oeconomica Stetinensia, Sciendo, vol. 23(2), pages 86-101, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrs:foeste:v:23:y:2023:i:2:p:86-101:n:21
    DOI: 10.2478/foli-2023-0020
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2478/foli-2023-0020
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2478/foli-2023-0020?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Al-Azzam, Moh'd & Carter Hill, R. & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2012. "Repayment performance in group lending: Evidence from Jordan," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 404-414.
    2. Giné, Xavier & Karlan, Dean S., 2014. "Group versus individual liability: Short and long term evidence from Philippine microcredit lending groups," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 65-83.
    3. Feroze, S.M. & Chauhan, A.K. & Malhotra, Ravinder & Kadian, K.S., 2011. "Factors Influencing Group Repayment Performance in Haryana: Application of Tobit Model," Agricultural Economics Research Review, Agricultural Economics Research Association (India), vol. 24(1), June.
    4. Erica Field & Rohini Pande, 2008. "Repayment Frequency and Default in Microfinance: Evidence From India," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 501-509, 04-05.
    5. Alexander S. Kritikos & Denitsa Vigenina, 2005. "Key Factors of Joint‐Liability Loan Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 213-238, May.
    6. Farhad Hossain & Tonya Knight, 2008. "Financing the Poor: Can microcredit make a difference? Empirical observations from Bangladesh," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series 3808, GDI, The University of Manchester.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pilar López-Sánchez & Elena Urquía-Grande & Cristina Campo & Andrés L. Cancer, 2022. "Delving into the Determinants of Default Risk in Savings Groups: Empirical Evidence from Ecuador," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 34(6), pages 2625-2650, December.
    2. Li Gan & Manuel A. Hernandez & Yanyan Liu, 2018. "Group Lending With Heterogeneous Types," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 895-913, April.
    3. Mohamed, Toka S. & Elgammal, Mohammed M., 2023. "Credit risk in Islamic microfinance institutions: The role of women, groups, and rural borrowers," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    4. Mahreen Mahmud, 2020. "Repaying Microcredit Loans: A Natural Experiment on Liability Structure," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(6), pages 1161-1176, June.
    5. Kazushi Takahashi & Abu Shonchoy & Seiro Ito & Takashi Kurosaki, 2017. "How Does Contract Design Affect the Uptake of Microcredit among the Ultra-poor? Experimental Evidence from the River Islands of Northern Bangladesh," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(4), pages 530-547, April.
    6. Chowdhury, Shyamal & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy & Sengupta, Kunal, 2014. "Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 167-180.
    7. Altınok, Ahmet & Sever, Can, 2014. "Efficient Microlending without Joint Liability," MPRA Paper 56598, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Carli, Francesco & Suetens, Sigrid & Uras, Burak & Visser, Philine, 2021. "Asymmetric Group Loan Contracts : Experimental Evidence," Other publications TiSEM 918d8091-4038-4d14-af04-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Weber, Ron & Mußhoff, Oliver & Petrick, Martin, 2014. "How flexible repayment schedules affect credit risk in agricultural microfinance," Department of Agricultural and Rural Development (DARE) Discussion Papers 187434, Georg-August-Universitaet Goettingen, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development (DARE).
    10. Dorfleitner, Gregor & Oswald, Eva-Maria, 2016. "Repayment behavior in peer-to-peer microfinancing: Empirical evidence from Kiva," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 45-59.
    11. Aragón, Fernando M. & Karaivanov, Alexander & Krishnaswamy, Karuna, 2020. "Credit lines in microcredit: Short-term evidence from a randomized controlled trial in India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    12. Orazio Attanasio & Britta Augsburg & Ralph De Haas, 2019. "Microcredit Contracts, Risk Diversification and Loan Take-Up," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 17(6), pages 1797-1842.
    13. Shahid Razzaque, 2019. "Choice of Microfinance Contracts and Repayment Rates under Individual Lending: An Artefactual Field Experiment from Pakistan," PIDE-Working Papers 2019:166, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
    14. Biener, Christian & Eling, Martin & Landmann, Andreas & Pradhan, Shailee, 2018. "Can group incentives alleviate moral hazard? The role of pro-social preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 230-249.
    15. Al-Azzam, Moh’d & Parmeter, Christopher F. & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2020. "On the complex relationship between different aspects of social capital and group loan repayment," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 92-107.
    16. Marc Labie & Carolina Laureti & Ariane Szafarz, 2016. "Discipline and Flexibility: A Behavioral Perspective on Product Design in Microfinance," Working Papers CEB 15-020, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    17. Kamaluddin, Amrizah & Hadi, Nabawiyah Abdul & Alam, Md. Mahmudul & Adil, Mohamed Azam Mohamed, 2019. "Social Collateral Model for Islamic Microfinance," SocArXiv ya8ft, Center for Open Science.
    18. Li, Qinghai & Yu, Yangcheng & Li, Yanru & Sun, Guanglin, 2023. "Heterogeneous Social network shape ability and willingness of rural residents to repay loans in China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    19. Cornée, Simon & Masclet, David, 2022. "Long-term relationships, group lending, and peer monitoring in microfinance: Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    20. Chmelíková, Gabriela & Krauss, Annette & Dvouletý, Ondřej, 2019. "Performance of microfinance institutions in Europe—Does social capital matter?," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    delinquency; self-help group; loan; SHG age; microfinance; repayment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R1 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G51 - Financial Economics - - Household Finance - - - Household Savings, Borrowing, Debt, and Wealth

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vrs:foeste:v:23:y:2023:i:2:p:86-101:n:21. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.sciendo.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.