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Moral Hazard in Natural Disaster Insurance Markets: Empirical Evidence from Germany and the United States

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  • Paul Hudson
  • W. J. Wouter Botzen
  • Jeffrey Czajkowski
  • Heidi Kreibich

Abstract

Moral hazard in natural disaster insurance markets results in policyholders preparing less, increasing the risk they face. However, moral hazard may not arise, due to high risk aversion or market context. We study the relationship between disaster risk reduction and insurance coverage to assess the presence of moral hazard for two different natural hazards, using four econometric models on survey data from Germany and the United States. The results show that moral hazard is absent. Nevertheless, adverse risk selection may be present. This has significant policy relevance such as opportunities for strengthening the link between insurance and risk reduction measures.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Hudson & W. J. Wouter Botzen & Jeffrey Czajkowski & Heidi Kreibich, 2017. "Moral Hazard in Natural Disaster Insurance Markets: Empirical Evidence from Germany and the United States," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 93(2), pages 179-208.
    • Handle: RePEc:uwp:landec:v:93:y:2017:i:2:p:179-208
    Note: DOI: 10.3368/le.93.2.179
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    Cited by:

    1. Ilaria Colivicchi & Gianluca Iannucci, 2023. "The Environmental Responsibility of Firms and Insurance Coverage in an Evolutionary Game," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 801-818, September.
    2. Andor, Mark A. & Osberghaus, Daniel & Simora, Michael, 2020. "Natural Disasters and Governmental Aid: Is there a Charity Hazard?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    3. Richert, Claire & Erdlenbruch, Katrin & Grelot, Frédéric, 2019. "The impact of flood management policies on individual adaptation actions: Insights from a French case study," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 1-1.
    4. Sunbin Yoo & Junya Kumagai & Yuta Kawabata & Alexander Ryota Keeley & Shunsuke Managi, 2022. "Insuring Well-Being: Psychological Adaptation to Disasters," Economics of Disasters and Climate Change, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 471-494, November.
    5. Max Tesselaar & W. J. Wouter Botzen & Toon Haer & Paul Hudson & Timothy Tiggeloven & Jeroen C. J. H. Aerts, 2020. "Regional Inequalities in Flood Insurance Affordability and Uptake under Climate Change," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(20), pages 1-30, October.
    6. Arnaud Reynaud & Manh-Hung Nguyen & Cécile Aubert, 2018. "Is there a demand for flood insurance in Vietnam? Results from a choice experiment," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 20(3), pages 593-617, July.
    7. Daniel Osberghaus & Christian Groß & Gert G. Wagner & Frank Offermann & Christoph Duden & Jonas Schmitt & Michael Berlemann & Jörg Asmussen & Markus Roth & Lamia Messari-Becker & Nicola Garbarino & Ben, 2021. "Extreme Weather Events: State Aid or Private Provision – Who Bears the Costs?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 74(11), pages 03-28, November.
    8. Welsch, David M. & Winden, Matthew W. & Zimmer, David M., 2022. "The effect of flood mitigation spending on flood damage: Accounting for dynamic feedback," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    9. Qihao He & Michael Faure & Chengwei Liu, 2023. "The possibilities and limits of insurance as governance in insuring pandemics," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 48(3), pages 641-668, July.
    10. Chiradip Chatterjee & Nafisa Halim & Pallab Mozumder, 2021. "Emission Tax, Health Insurance, and Information: A Mechanism Design for Reducing Energy Consumption and Emission Risk," Economics of Disasters and Climate Change, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 465-480, October.
    11. Osberghaus, Daniel & Reif, Christiane, 2021. "How do different compensation schemes and loss experience affect insurance decisions? Experimental evidence from two independent and heterogeneous samples," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    12. Unterberger, Christian & Hudson, Paul & Botzen, W.J. Wouter & Schroeer, Katharina & Steininger, Karl W., 2019. "Future Public Sector Flood Risk and Risk Sharing Arrangements: An Assessment for Austria," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 153-163.
    13. Adachi, Daisuke & Nakata, Hiroyuki & Sawada, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Kunio, 2023. "Adverse selection and moral hazard in corporate insurance markets: Evidence from the 2011 Thailand floods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 205(C), pages 376-386.
    14. Peilu Zhang & Marco A. Palma, 2021. "Compulsory Versus Voluntary Insurance: An Online Experiment," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 103(1), pages 106-125, January.
    15. Carolyn Kousky & Noelwah R. Netusil, 2023. "Flood insurance literacy and flood risk knowledge: Evidence from Portland, Oregon," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 26(2), pages 175-201, July.
    16. Carolyn Kousky & Howard Kunreuther, 2018. "Risk Management Roles of the Public and Private Sector," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 21(1), pages 181-204, March.
    17. Paul Hudson & Annegret H. Thieken, 2022. "The presence of moral hazard regarding flood insurance and German private businesses," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 112(2), pages 1295-1319, June.
    18. Daniel Osberghaus & Christina Demski, 2019. "The causal effect of flood experience on climate engagement: evidence from search requests for green electricity," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 191-207, September.
    19. Swenja Surminski & Paul Hudson, 2017. "Investigating the Risk Reduction Potential of Disaster Insurance Across Europe," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 42(2), pages 247-274, April.
    20. Shiyi Chen & Xiaoxiao Ding & Pingyi Lou & Hong Song, 2022. "New evidence of moral hazard: Environmental liability insurance and firms' environmental performance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 89(3), pages 581-613, September.
    21. Mol, Jantsje M. & Botzen, W. J. Wouter & Blasch, Julia E., 2020. "Risk reduction in compulsory disaster insurance: Experimental evidence on moral hazard and financial incentives," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    22. Stefan Borsky & Hannah Hennighausen, 2022. "Public Flood Risk Mitigation and the Homeowner’s Insurance Demand Response," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 98(4), pages 537-559.
    23. W. J. Wouter Botzen & Howard Kunreuther & Erwann Michel-Kerjan, 2019. "Protecting against disaster risks: Why insurance and prevention may be complements," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 151-169, October.
    24. Arthur Charpentier & Laurence Barry & Molly R. James, 2022. "Insurance against natural catastrophes: balancing actuarial fairness and social solidarity," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 47(1), pages 50-78, January.
    25. Mol, Jantsje M. & Botzen, W.J. Wouter & Blasch, Julia E., 2020. "Behavioral motivations for self-insurance under different disaster risk insurance schemes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 967-991.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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