Exit and Inefficiency: The Effects of Ownership Type
Abstract
This study uses data on hospital closures to examine the relation between exit and inefficiency in an industry where for-profit, not-for-profit, and government firms coexist. The likelihood of hospital exit over the period 1986-91 is estimated as a function of hospital relative inefficiency, ownership type, and other factors, where hospital relative inefficiency is measured using residuals from estimation of a stochastic frontier cost function. We find that less efficient hospitals were more likely to exit when ownership was for-profit or not-for-profit, but that relative inefficiency did not have a significant effect on the probability of exit for government hospitals.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by University of Wisconsin Press in its journal Journal of Human Resources.
Volume (Year): 35 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 734-747
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Web page: http://jhr.uwpress.org/
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Federico Ciliberto & Richard C. Lindrooth, 2007.
"Exit From The Hospital Industry,"
Economic Inquiry,
Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(1), pages 71-81, 01.
- Ciliberto, Federico & Lindrooth, Richard, 2007. "Exit from the Hospital Industry," MPRA Paper 24917, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Peter Nunnenkamp & Hannes Öhler & Tillmann Schwörer, 2011.
"US based NGOs in International Development Cooperation: Survival of the Fittest?,"
Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers
83, Courant Research Centre PEG.
- Peter Nunnenkamp & Hannes Öhler & Tillmann Schwörer, 2011. "US based NGOs in International Development Cooperation: Survival of the Fittest?," DEGIT Conference Papers c016_046, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
- Peter Nunnenkamp & Hannes Öhler & Tillmann Schwörer, 2011. "US based NGOs in International Development Cooperation: Survival of the Fittest?," Kiel Working Papers 1717, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
- Sujoy Chakravarty & Martin Gaynor & Steven Klepper & William B. Vogt, 2006.
"Does the profit motive make Jack nimble? Ownership form and the evolution of the US hospital industry,"
Health Economics,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(4), pages 345-361.
- Sujoy Chakravarty & Martin Gaynor & Steven Klepper & William B. Vogt, 2005. "Does the Profit Motive Make Jack Nimble? Ownership Form and the Evolution of the U.S. Hospital Industry," GSIA Working Papers 2005-E55, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Sujoy Chakravarty & Martin Gaynor & Steven Klepper & William B. Vogt, 2005. "Does the Profit Motive Make Jack Nimble? Ownership Form and the Evolution of the U.S. Hospital Industry," NBER Working Papers 11705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Boyan Jovanovic & Chung-Yi Tse, 2006. "Creative Destruction in Industries," NBER Working Papers 12520, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Martin Gaynor & Robert J. Town, 2011. "Competition in Health Care Markets," NBER Working Papers 17208, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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