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Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks

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  • Grossman, Sanford J
  • Hart, Oliver D
  • Maskin, Eric S

Abstract

Consider an economy subject to two kinds of shocks: (a) an observable shock to the relative demand for final goods which causes dispersion in relative prices, and (b) shocks, unobservable by workers, to the technology for transforming intermediate goods into final goods. A worker in a particular intermediate goods industry knows that the unobserved price of his output is determined by (1) the technological shock that determines which final goods industry uses his output intensively and (2) the price of the final good that uses his output intensively. When there is very little relative price dispersion among final goods, then it doesn't matter which final goods industry uses the worker's output. Thus the technological shock is of very little importance in creating uncertainty about the worker's marginal product when there is little dispersion of relative prices. Hence an increase in the dispersion of relative prices amplifies the effect of technological uncertainty on a worker's marginal value product. We consider a model of optimal labor contracts in a situation where the workers have less information than the firm about their marginal value product. A relative price shock of the type described above increases the uncertainty which workers have about their marginal value product. We show that with an optimal asymmetric information employment contract the industries which are adversely affected by the relative price shock will contract more than they would under complete information (i.e., where workers could observe their marginal value product). On the other hand the industry which is favorably affected by the relative price shock will - not expand by more than would be the case under complete information. Hence an observed relative demand shock, which would leave aggregate employment unchanged under complete information, will cause aggregate employment to fall under asymmetric information about the technological shock.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 91 (1983)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
Pages: 907-28

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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:91:y:1983:i:6:p:907-28

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References

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  1. Blanchard, Olivier Jean, 1979. "Wage Indexing Rules and the Behavior of the Economy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(4), pages 798-815, August.
  2. Fischer, Stanley, 1982. "Relative price variability and inflation in the United States and Germany," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 171-196.
  3. Fischer, Stanley, 1982. "Relative price variability and inflation in the United States and Germany," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 171-196.
  4. Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April.
  5. Grossman, Sanford J & Weiss, Laurence, 1982. "Heterogeneous Information and the Theory of the Business Cycle," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(4), pages 699-727, August.
  6. Harris Milton & Townsend, Robert M, 1981. "Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 33-64, January.
  7. Parks, Richard W, 1978. "Inflation and Relative Price Variability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(1), pages 79-95, February.
  8. Holmstrom, Bengt R & Weiss, Laurence, 1985. "Managerial Incentives, Investment, and Aggregate Implications: Scale Effects," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(3), pages 403-25, July.
  9. Stanley Fischer & Franco Modigliani, 1978. "Towards An Understanding of the Real Effects and Costs of Inflation," NBER Working Papers 0303, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. repec:nbr:nberre:0126 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
  12. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1981. "Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 301-07, May.
  13. Taylor, John B, 1980. "Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(1), pages 1-23, February.
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Cited by:
  1. Matthew B. Canzoneri & Anne C. Sibert, 1984. "The macroeconomic implications of labor contracting with asymmetric information," International Finance Discussion Papers 248, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  2. William P. Osterberg, 1992. "Intervention and the bid-ask spread in G-3 foreign exchange rates," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q II, pages 2-13.
  3. Kahn, Charles M. & Mookherjee, Dilip, 1995. "Market failure with moral hazard and side trading," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 159-184, October.
  4. Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, 1984. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Business Cycles and Price Wars During Booms," Working papers 349, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  5. Joseph G. Haubrich & Robert G. King, 1990. "Sticky prices, money, and business fluctuations," Working Paper 9008, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  6. Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1988. "Imperfect Information, Credit Markets and Unemployment," NBER Working Papers 2093, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Pablo Ruiz VerdĂș, 2002. "Employer Behavior When Workers Can Unionize," Business Economics Working Papers wb020803, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de EconomĂ­a de la Empresa.
  8. Joseph G. Haubrich, 1992. "Sluggish deposit rates: endogenous institutions and aggregate fluctuations," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q II, pages 23-35.
  9. Russell Cooper, 1986. "Optimal Labor Contracts, Imperfect Competition and Underemployment Equilibria: A Framework for Analysis," NBER Working Papers 2060, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Ian M. McDonald, 1984. "Trying to Understand Stagflation," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 17(3), pages 32-56.
  11. Duranton, Gilles & Haniotis, Toni, 2004. "A comparison between economic systems with an application to transition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(9-10), pages 2125-2157, August.

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