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Delegating Decisions to Experts

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Author Info

  • Hao Li
  • Wing Suen

Abstract

We present a model of delegation with self-interested and privately informed experts. A team of experts with extreme but opposite biases is acceptable to a wide range of decision makers with diverse preferences, but the value of expertise from such a team is low. A decision maker wants to appoint experts who are less partisan than he is in order to facilitate information pooling by the expert team. Selective delegation, either by controlling the decision-making process or by conditioning the delegation decision on his own information, is an effective way for the decision maker to safeguard own interests while making use of expert information.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 112 (2004)
Issue (Month): S1 (February)
Pages: S311-S335

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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:112:y:2004:i:s1:p:s311-s335

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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Robin Boadway & Motohiro Sato, 2006. "Bureaucratic Advice and Political Governance," Working Papers 1070, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  2. Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 2001. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1478-1497, December.
  3. Rodney D. Ludema & Anders Olofsgård, 2006. "Delegation versus Communication in the Organization of Government," Working Papers gueconwpa~06-06-04, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  4. Sobbrio, Francesco, 2014. "Citizen-editors' endogenous information acquisition and news accuracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 43-53.
  5. Yeon-Koo Che & Navin Kartik, 2009. "Opinions as Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(5), pages 815-860, October.
  6. Matthew Elliott & Benjamin Golub & Andrei Kirilenko, 2014. "How Sharing Information Can Garble Experts' Advice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 463-68, May.
  7. Marina Dodlova, 2013. "Political Accountability and Real Authority of Government Bureaucracy," CESifo Working Paper Series 4443, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Ulrich Doraszelski, 1999. "Deliberations with Double-Sided Information," Discussion Papers 1276R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Francesco Sobbrio, 2012. "A Citizen-Editors Model of News Media," RSCAS Working Papers 2012/61, European University Institute.
  10. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  11. Marino, Anthony M., 2006. "Delegation versus an approval process and the demand for talent," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 487-503, May.

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