IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlstud/doi10.1086-676332.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Rationally Arbitrary Decisions in Administrative Law

Author

Listed:
  • Adrian Vermeule

Abstract

How should administrative law cope with genuine uncertainty, in which probabilities cannot be attached to outcomes? I argue that there is an important category of agency decisions under uncertainty in which it is rational to be arbitrary. Rational arbitrariness arises when no first-order reason can be given for the agency's choice, yet the agency has valid second-order reasons to make a particular choice. When these conditions obtain, even coin flipping may be a perfectly rational strategy of decision making for agencies. Courts should defer to rationally arbitrary decisions. There is a proper role for courts in ensuring that agencies have adequately invested resources in information gathering, which may dispel uncertainty. Yet in some cases the value of further investments in information gathering will be genuinely uncertain. If so, courts should defer to agencies' second-order choices about informational investments on the same grounds that justify deference to agencies' first-order choices under uncertainty. If the [Board of Immigration Appeals] proposed to narrow the class of deportable aliens eligible to seek [legal] relief by flipping a coin--heads an alien may apply for relief, tails he may not--we would reverse the policy in an instant. That is because agency action must be based on non-arbitrary, "relevant factors." (Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 485 [2011] [Kagan, J.])The sense in which I am using the term ["uncertainty"] is that in which the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealth-owners in the social system in 1970. About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know. Nevertheless, the necessity for action and for decision compels us as practical men to do our best to overlook this awkward fact and to behave exactly as we should if we had behind us a good Benthamite calculation of a series of prospective advantages and disadvantages, each multiplied by its appropriate probability, waiting to be summed. (Keynes 1937, p. 214)

Suggested Citation

  • Adrian Vermeule, 2015. "Rationally Arbitrary Decisions in Administrative Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(S2), pages 475-507.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/676332
    DOI: 10.1086/676332
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/676332
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/676332
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/676332?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:cup:cbooks:9780511771576 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Avinash K. Dixit & Robert S. Pindyck, 1994. "Investment under Uncertainty," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 5474.
    3. Stigler, George J., 2011. "Economics of Information," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 5, pages 35-49.
    4. Dimitris Bertsimas & Melvyn Sim, 2004. "The Price of Robustness," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 52(1), pages 35-53, February.
    5. Kelsey, David, 1993. "Choice under Partial Uncertainty," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(2), pages 297-308, May.
    6. Yehonatan Givati & Matthew C. Stephenson, 2011. "Judicial Deference to Inconsistent Agency Statutory Interpretations," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 85-113.
    7. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    8. Nabil I. Al-Najjar, 2015. "A Bayesian Framework for the Precautionary Principle," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(S2), pages 337-365.
    9. Martin L. Weitzman, 2009. "On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 91(1), pages 1-19, February.
    10. Richard B. McKenzie, 1978. "On the Methodological Boundaries of Economic Analysis," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(3), pages 627-645, September.
    11. Gary W. Yohe & Richard S.J. Tol, 2007. "Precaution And A Dismal Theorem: Implications For Climate Policy And Climate Research," Working Papers FNU-145, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Aug 2007.
    12. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
    13. Kelsey, David & Quiggin, John, 1992. "Theories of Choice under Ignorance and Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 133-153.
    14. Richard T. Woodward & Richard C. Bishop, 1997. "How to Decide When Experts Disagree: Uncertainty-Based Choice Rules in Environmental Policy," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 73(4), pages 492-507.
    15. -, 2009. "The economics of climate change," Sede Subregional de la CEPAL para el Caribe (Estudios e Investigaciones) 38679, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    16. Easley,David & Kleinberg,Jon, 2010. "Networks, Crowds, and Markets," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521195331.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Nabil I. Al-Najjar, 2015. "A Bayesian Framework for the Precautionary Principle," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(S2), pages 337-365.
    2. Charles F. Manski, 2015. "Randomizing Regulatory Approval for Adaptive Diversification and Deterrence," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(S2), pages 367-385.
    3. Elias Bouacida & Renaud Foucart, 2022. "Rituals of Reason," Working Papers 344119591, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. W. Botzen & Jeroen Bergh, 2014. "Specifications of Social Welfare in Economic Studies of Climate Policy: Overview of Criteria and Related Policy Insights," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 58(1), pages 1-33, May.
    2. Aldred, Jonathan, 2013. "Justifying precautionary policies: Incommensurability and uncertainty," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 132-140.
    3. Olijslagers, Stan & van der Ploeg, Frederick & van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 2023. "On current and future carbon prices in a risky world," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    4. Agliardi, Elettra & Sereno, Luigi, 2011. "The effects of environmental taxes and quotas on the optimal timing of emission reductions under Choquet–Brownian uncertainty," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 2793-2802.
    5. Chen, Yu-Fu & Funke, Michael & Glanemann, Nicole, 2011. "Dark Clouds or Silver Linings? Knightian Uncertainty and Climate Change," SIRE Discussion Papers 2011-64, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    6. Iverson, Terrence, 2012. "Communicating Trade-offs amid Controversial Science: Decision Support for Climate Policy," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 74-90.
    7. Shaw, W. Douglass & Woodward, Richard T., 2008. "Why environmental and resource economists should care about non-expected utility models," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 66-89, January.
    8. van den Bergh, J.C.J.M. & Botzen, W.J.W., 2015. "Monetary valuation of the social cost of CO2 emissions: A critical survey," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 33-46.
    9. Richard S. J. Tol & In Chang Hwang & Frédéric Reynès, 2012. "The Effect of Learning on Climate Policy under Fat-tailed Uncertainty," Working Paper Series 5312, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School.
    10. Fleurbaey, Marc & Zuber, Stéphane, 2017. "Fair management of social risk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 666-706.
    11. Gernot Wagner & Richard Zeckhauser, 2012. "Climate policy: hard problem, soft thinking," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 110(3), pages 507-521, February.
    12. W. A. Brock & A. Xepapadeas, 2015. "Modeling Coupled Climate, Ecosystems, and Economic Systems," Working Papers 2015.66, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    13. Nordhaus, William, 2013. "Integrated Economic and Climate Modeling," Handbook of Computable General Equilibrium Modeling, in: Peter B. Dixon & Dale Jorgenson (ed.), Handbook of Computable General Equilibrium Modeling, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 1069-1131, Elsevier.
    14. Thomas D. Pol & Ekko C. Ierland & Silke Gabbert, 2017. "Economic analysis of adaptive strategies for flood risk management under climate change," Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 267-285, February.
    15. Assa, Hirbod & Zimper, Alexander, 2018. "Preferences over all random variables: Incompatibility of convexity and continuity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 71-83.
    16. T. D. Pol & S. Gabbert & H.-P. Weikard & E. C. Ierland & E. M. T. Hendrix, 2017. "A Minimax Regret Analysis of Flood Risk Management Strategies Under Climate Change Uncertainty and Emerging Information," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 68(4), pages 1087-1109, December.
    17. Erin Baker & Olaitan Olaleye & Lara Aleluia Reis, 2015. "Decision Frameworks and the Investment in R&D," Working Papers 2015.42, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    18. Nicholas Stern, 2013. "The Structure of Economic Modeling of the Potential Impacts of Climate Change: Grafting Gross Underestimation of Risk onto Already Narrow Science Models," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(3), pages 838-859, September.
    19. Dobes Leo & Jotzo Frank & Stern David I., 2014. "The Economics of Global Climate Change: A Historical Literature Review," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 65(3), pages 281-320, December.
    20. Dannenberg, Astrid & Mennel, Tim & Osberghaus, Daniel & Sturm, Bodo, 2009. "The economics of adaptation to climate change: the case of Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 09-057, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/676332. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.