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Private School Competition and Public School Teacher Salaries

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  • RICHARD VEDDER
  • JOSHUA HALL

Abstract

Teacher unions have fiercely fought public policy measures (e.g., vouchers, tuition tax credits) that might increase the proportion of students attending private schools. Yet increased competition in the educational service market should also lead to greater labor market competition, reducing any quasi-monopsony tendencies depressing teacher salaries. Using detailed data on over 600 Ohio school districts, we find that increased private school competition leads to higher salaries for public school teachers. It may be that union leaders disregard the interests of their members in trying to maximizing union size and power. An alternative interpretation is that unions sacrifice short-run income gains for their members in order to maintain long-term economic rents associated with substantial political power.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Transaction Publishers in its journal Journal of Labor Research.

Volume (Year): 21 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 162-168

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Handle: RePEc:tra:jlabre:v:21:y:2000:i:1:p:162-168

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Web page: http://transactionpub.metapress.com/link.asp?target=journal&id=110581

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Cited by:
  1. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert A.J. Dur, 2002. "From Public Monopsony to Competitive Market: More Efficiency but Higher Prices," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-118/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 31 Jan 2008.
  2. Goldhaber, Dan & Destler, Katharine & Player, Daniel, 2010. "Teacher labor markets and the perils of using hedonics to estimate compensating differentials in the public sector," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-17, February.
  3. Winters, John V, 2010. "Teacher Salaries and Teacher Unions: A Spatial Econometric Approach," MPRA Paper 21202, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert A.J. Dur, 2002. "From Public Monopsony to Competitive Market: More Efficiency but Higher Prices," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-118/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 31 Jan 2008.
  5. Jackson, C. Kirabo, 2012. "School competition and teacher labor markets: Evidence from charter school entry in North Carolina," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(5), pages 431-448.
  6. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur, 2004. "Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-060/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  7. Sandstrom, F. Mikael & Bergstrom, Fredrik, 2005. "School vouchers in practice: competition will not hurt you," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2-3), pages 351-380, February.
  8. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur, 2004. "Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the Public Sector," CESifo Working Paper Series 1223, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. Clive Belfield & Celia Brown & Hywel Thomas, 2002. "Workplaces in the Education Sector in the United Kingdom: How do they Differ from those in Other Industries?," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(1), pages 49-69.

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