Private School Competition and Public School Teacher Salaries
Abstract
Teacher unions have fiercely fought public policy measures (e.g., vouchers, tuition tax credits) that might increase the proportion of students attending private schools. Yet increased competition in the educational service market should also lead to greater labor market competition, reducing any quasi-monopsony tendencies depressing teacher salaries. Using detailed data on over 600 Ohio school districts, we find that increased private school competition leads to higher salaries for public school teachers. It may be that union leaders disregard the interests of their members in trying to maximizing union size and power. An alternative interpretation is that unions sacrifice short-run income gains for their members in order to maintain long-term economic rents associated with substantial political power.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Transaction Publishers in its journal Journal of Labor Research.
Volume (Year): 21 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 162-168
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Handle: RePEc:tra:jlabre:v:21:y:2000:i:1:p:162-168
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Web page: http://transactionpub.metapress.com/link.asp?target=journal&id=110581
For corrections or technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur, 2009.
"From public monopsony to competitive market: more efficiency but higher prices,"
Oxford Economic Papers,
Oxford University Press, vol. 61(3), pages 586-602, July.
- Josse Delfgaauw & Robert A.J. Dur, 2002. "From Public Monopsony to Competitive Market: More Efficiency but Higher Prices," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-118/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 31 Jan 2008.
- Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur, 2003. "From Public Monopsony to Competitive Market: More Efficiency but Higher Prices," CESifo Working Paper Series 1095, CESifo Group Munich.
- Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur, 2008.
"Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector,"
Economic Journal,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 171-191, 01.
- Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur, 2004. "Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the Public Sector," CESifo Working Paper Series 1223, CESifo Group Munich.
- Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur, 2004. "Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-060/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Rincke, Johannes, 2006. "Competition in the public school sector: Evidence on strategic interaction among US school districts," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 352-369, May.
- Clive Belfield & Celia Brown & Hywel Thomas, 2002. "Workplaces in the Education Sector in the United Kingdom: How do they Differ from those in Other Industries?," Education Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 10(1), pages 49-69.
- Winters, John V, 2010. "Teacher Salaries and Teacher Unions: A Spatial Econometric Approach," MPRA Paper 21202, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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