Modeling And Testing For Heterogeneity In Observed Strategic Behavior
AbstractExperimental data have consistently shown diversity in beliefs as well as in actions among experimental subjects. This paper presents and compares alternative behavioral econometric models for the characterization of player heterogeneity, both between and within subpopulations of players. In particular, two econometric models of diversity within subpopulations of players are investigated, one using a model of computational errors and the other allowing for diversity in prior beliefs around a modal prior for the subpopulation. © 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MIT Press in its journal The Review of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): 83 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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