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Level-n Bounded Rationality on a Level Playing Field of Sequential Games Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Ernan Haruvy
Dale Stahl
We report experimental results using a multi-task for simple two-player, two- stage extensive-form games. It is suggested that by creating the perception of a "level playing field" the participants are relieved of responsibility for others since competition on a level playing field is presumed to be fair a priori. Consistent with this suggestion, we find that the vast majority of behavior is individualistic. Moreover, we find that a straightforward extension of the Level-n theory of bounded rationality fits this data remarkably well. We also extend this theory to allow other-regarding preferences, and find that about 15% of the population behaves as if utilitarian and/or spiteful
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Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings with number
126.
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Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecm:nawm04:126Contact details of provider: Phone: 1 212 998 3820 Fax: 1 212 995 4487 Email: Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: Bounded rationality ; sequential games ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games C5 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling
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