Yardstick Competition in Toll Revenues: Evidence from US States
AbstractStates have competed against one another in a variety of fiscal venues. We demonstrate that toll revenues are another such arena, with states competing with those states from which they receive and/or send many commuters. Because the size of interstate commuters is small relative to intrastate commuters, and because commuters exhibit inelastic behaviour with regard to toll changes, we argue that competition over tolls is an example of political-based yardstick competition. © 2009 LSE and the University of Bath
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by London School of Economics and University of Bath in its journal Journal of Transport Economics and Policy.
Volume (Year): 43 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.bath.ac.uk/e-journals/jtep
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- DE BORGER, Bruno & PROOST, Stef, 2012. "Transport policy competition between governments: A selective survey of the literature," Working Papers 2012014, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
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