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The sharing Powers in the Constitution of Federal States: The Applicability of Decentralization

Author

Listed:
  • Ali Tawfiq Hassan

    (College of Law, Salahaddin University, Erbil, Kurdistan Region-Iraq)

  • Namam M. Salih

    (Faculty of Engineering, Petroleum Engineering Department, Soran University, Soran, Kurdistan Region-Iraq, Scientific Research Center (SRC), Soran University, Soran, Kurdistan Region-Iraq)

  • Amera Jaafar Shareef

    (Department of Legal Administration, Erbil Technical Administration Institute, Erbil, Kurdistan Region-Iraq)

Abstract

This paper focuses on the applicability of federal system as a legal-political means in providing Minorities Rights and managing the relationship among various constituent groups as a real foundation of decentralization principle in sharing powers between constituent units. The federal system can be realized through the establishment of federal constitutions. We exemplify Iraq as a federal model of multi-culturalism state that accommodating with new development of democratic principles, which associate with diversity and decentralization in sharing power. The Iraqi constitution is approved through referendum, the Kurdistan population is also participated in this referendum, where the Kurdistan entity and equality among its national and religious components has been de jure recognized. Article 117(1) identify the Kurdistan as a sovereign federal unit enjoying legal-political competences. The study suggests a legal solution to minimize the conflicts between Iraqi entities, legal approach to resolve the ambiguity in several articles: 112(1), 116, 117(2), and 140(2).

Suggested Citation

  • Ali Tawfiq Hassan & Namam M. Salih & Amera Jaafar Shareef, 2022. "The sharing Powers in the Constitution of Federal States: The Applicability of Decentralization," Eximia Journal, Plus Communication Consulting SRL, vol. 5(1), pages 540-551, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:tec:eximia:v:5:y:2022:i:1:p:540-551
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Christoph A. Schaltegger & Lars P. Feld, 2001. "On Government Centralization and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland," CESifo Working Paper Series 615, CESifo.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Federal system; sharing powers; decentralization; constitution; Kurdistan Region; Iraq;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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