Dynamic Spatial Monopoly with Product Development
AbstractAbstract The optimal R&D investment in product innovation of a profit-seeking monopolist is characterized vs that of a social planner in a spatial market with transportation disutility, under full market coverage. It is shown that the planner's incentive to innovate is always weaker than the monopolist's, since the planner trades off the minimization of the social cost of transportation against the cost of R&D.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Spatial Economic Analysis.
Volume (Year): 2 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
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