The Political Economy of Water Abstraction Charges
AbstractAn important economic instrument in the management of a river catchment's water resources is the charges made by government for the abstraction of water from ground and surface sources. Abstraction charges are a form of rent. However, the classical theory of differential rent has limited application to abstraction prices because that theory's assumption of competition in the supply of the natural resource does not hold in this case. Here, the property rights of individual households and of institutions to draw water are assigned by a state monopoly. In order to understand the specific and contingent practices of government in different countries, a taxonomy of charge-setting principles is proposed. This paper sets out six principal fields of action for sustainable water resource planning and, in that context, recommends full incentive charging as the basis of catchment policy.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Review of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 11 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/CRPE20
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hearne, R.R. & Easter, K.W., 1995. "Water Allocation and Water Markets. An Analysis of Gains-from-Trade in Chile," Papers 315, World Bank - Technical Papers.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.