This paper presents a model in which countries form economic unions which each determine common commercial policy and coordinate public good investment which generate cross-country externalities for its members. The scenario that all countries integrate into unions of the same size is studied. The focus is how the public good investment and national welfare vary with degrees of trade barriers and regionalism. Results are compared with those obtained in the public goods coordination literature that assumes free trade or homogeneous private goods. [F15, H40]
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Volume (Year): 11 (1997) Issue (Month): 2 (June) Pages: 117-135 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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