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International Signaling and Economic Sanctions

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  • Taehee Whang
  • Hannah June Kim

Abstract

Do economic sanctions serve international signaling purposes? A fully structural statistical model that employs a signaling game as a statistical model is used to investigate the existence of signaling effects of sanctions. Estimation results suggest that sanctions fail to work as a costly signal. The cheapness of sanctions prevents a target state from being able to distinguish a resolute sender state from a sender who is bluffing. When sanctions are imposed, a target rarely updates its initial evaluation of the sender state’s resolve, much less than when a military challenge is observed.

Suggested Citation

  • Taehee Whang & Hannah June Kim, 2015. "International Signaling and Economic Sanctions," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(3), pages 427-452, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:3:p:427-452
    DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1024242
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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