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Revealing Preferences: Empirical Estimation of a Crisis Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information

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  • Lewis, Jeffrey B.
  • Schultz, Kenneth A.

Abstract

We develop an empirical estimator directly from an extensive-form crisis bargaining game with incomplete information and discuss its features and limitations. The estimator makes it possible to draw inferences about states' payoffs from observational data on crisis outcomes while remaining faithful to the theorized strategic and informational structure. We compare this estimator to one based on a symmetric information version of the same game, using the quantal response equilibrium proposed in this context by Signorino (1999, American Political Science Review 93:279–298). We then address issues of identification that arise in trying to learn about actors' utilities by observing their play of a strategic game. In general, a number of identifying restrictions are needed in order to pin down the distribution of payoffs and the effects of covariates on those payoffs.

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  • Lewis, Jeffrey B. & Schultz, Kenneth A., 2003. "Revealing Preferences: Empirical Estimation of a Crisis Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(4), pages 345-367.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:polals:v:11:y:2003:i:04:p:345-367_01
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    Cited by:

    1. Taehee Whang & Hannah June Kim, 2015. "International Signaling and Economic Sanctions," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(3), pages 427-452, May.
    2. Muhammet A Bas & Curtis S Signorino & Taehee Whang, 2014. "Knowing one’s future preferences: A correlated agent model with Bayesian updating," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(1), pages 3-34, January.
    3. Yong Kyun Kim, 2017. "Inequality and Sovereign Default under Democracy," Journal of Economics and Financial Analysis, Tripal Publishing House, vol. 1(1), pages 81-115.
    4. Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Simon Hug & Livia Isabella Schubiger & Julian Wucherpfennig, 2011. "International Conventions and Non-State Actors: Selection, Signaling, and Reputation Effects," HiCN Working Papers 108, Households in Conflict Network.
    5. Muhammet A. Bas, 2012. "Measuring Uncertainty in International Relations: Heteroskedastic Strategic Models," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(5), pages 490-520, November.
    6. Kenkel, Brenton & Signorino, Curtis, 2014. "Estimating Extensive Form Games in R," Journal of Statistical Software, Foundation for Open Access Statistics, vol. 56(i08).
    7. Douglas M. Gibler, 2008. "The Costs of Reneging," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(3), pages 426-454, June.
    8. Alastair Smith & Allan C. Stam, 2004. "Bargaining and the Nature of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(6), pages 783-813, December.
    9. Michael Chwe, 2006. "Statistical Game Theory," Theory workshop papers 815595000000000004, UCLA Department of Economics.
    10. Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Simon Hug & Livia Isabella Schubiger & Julian Wucherpfennig, 2018. "International Conventions and Nonstate Actors," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 62(2), pages 346-380, February.

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