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Limits to the independence of the ECB

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  • Charles Wyplosz

    (The Graduate Institute, Geneva)

Abstract

The ECB might seem to be the most independent central bank in the world. Its statutes were carefully designed to ensure independence and they are enshrined in an international treaty. Yet, while serving many governments may be a protection, it can also act as a constraint on policy decisions. This essay explains how the ECB has faced limits during the Eurozone crisis. First, it had to find ways to circumvent limitations to its essential function of lender in last resort to both banks and governments. Second, the procedure to appoint members of the Executive Board is open to political interferences. Finally, it is not well protected from fiscal dominance.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Wyplosz, 2019. "Limits to the independence of the ECB," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 155(1), pages 35-41, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:weltar:v:155:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s10290-018-0328-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s10290-018-0328-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Deadly Embrace: Sovereign and Financial Balance Sheets Doom Loops," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(3), pages 1781-1823.
    2. Charles Wyplosz, 2013. "Europe’s Quest for Fiscal Discipline," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 498, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ehrmann, Michael & Holton, Sarah & Kedan, Danielle & Phelan, Gillian, 2021. "Monetary policy communication: perspectives from former policy makers at the ECB," Working Paper Series 2627, European Central Bank.
    2. Heinemann, Friedrich & Kemper, Jan, 2022. "Inflation of objectives instead of focus on inflation? Evidence on the ECB objective function from a textual analysis," ZEW Expert Briefs 22-07, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    3. Heinemann Friedrich & Kemper Jan, 2021. "The ECB Under the Threat of Fiscal Dominance – The Individual Central Banker Dimension," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 5-30, December.
    4. Laura Alfaro & Paul R. Bergin, 2019. "Introduction to: the euro at twenty," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 155(1), pages 1-3, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central bank independence; Fiscal dominance; Lending in last resort; Euro Area;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook

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