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Auswirkungen der Einführung von interner Leistungsverrechnung auf die Effizienz im Krankenhaus

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  • Ludwig Kuntz

    (Universität zu Köln)

  • Antonio Vera

Abstract

Summary The present study investigates in what way transfer pricing can be introduced into a hospital and what effects this has on efficiency. An empirical evaluation is carried out, taking as an example the transfer pricing of the anaesthesia services in the University Hospital Hamburg-Eppendorf (UKE) in Germany, which was introduced at the beginning of 2001. The empirical analysis includes the anaesthesia data of more than 60,000 operations in the period from 2000 to 2002. The main result of this study is that an improvement in the efficiency of the operating surgeons could be measured after the introduction of transfer pricing for anaesthesia services. However, the empirical analysis leads to partly inconsistent findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Ludwig Kuntz & Antonio Vera, 2005. "Auswirkungen der Einführung von interner Leistungsverrechnung auf die Effizienz im Krankenhaus," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 57(7), pages 595-616, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:57:y:2005:i:7:d:10.1007_bf03377352
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03377352
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Dranove, 1987. "Rate-Setting by Diagnosis Related Groups and Hospital Specialization," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 417-427, Autumn.
    2. Robert B. Fetter, 1991. "Diagnosis Related Groups: Understanding Hospital Performance," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 21(1), pages 6-26, February.
    3. Mendelson, Haim & Pillai, Ravindran R., 1999. "Information Age organizations, dynamics and performance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 253-281, March.
    4. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1986. "Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement : Cost sharing and supply," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 129-151, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    I10; L22;

    JEL classification:

    • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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