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Zur Funktion von Studiengebühren angesichts von Informationsasymmetrien auf Humankapitalmärkten

Author

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  • Egon Franck

    (Universität Zürich)

  • Christian Opitz

    (TU Bergakademie Freiberg)

Abstract

Summary Institutions of Higher Education certify students’ quality by issuing degrees and other credentials. Information asymmetries between the university and its clients, however, require valid signals of the universities’ quality, too. A performance based university compensation scheme can be viewed as a bonding-mechanism. Tuition which is not contingent on the value added through Higher Education extenuates the mechanism’s efficiency. We show that tuition nevertheless can create economic value, preventing an adverse selection of wealthy but less talented students and individuals who consume education rather than investing in future earnings. In addition, tuition increases the signaling content of some degrees. Individuals from groups more likely to consume education, like women for example, are able to signal their intention to engage in a lasting and demanding career. Thus, the allocation in some segments of the labor market can be improved.

Suggested Citation

  • Egon Franck & Christian Opitz, 2001. "Zur Funktion von Studiengebühren angesichts von Informationsasymmetrien auf Humankapitalmärkten," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 91-106, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:53:y:2001:i:2:d:10.1007_bf03372643
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03372643
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Uwe Jirjahn, 2007. "Welche Faktoren beeinflussen den Erfolg im wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Studium?," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 286-313, May.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J79 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Other
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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