On the existence and efficiency of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a n-player prisoners' dilemma
AbstractWe show that there exist von Neumann-Morgenstern (vN-M) stable sets in a n-player version of the prisoners' dilemma game with preplay negotiations in which every player can deviate unilaterally from the currently proposed combination of actions but can not do so jointly with other players, and that every vN-M stable set includes at least one Pareto-efficient outcome. The negotiation among the players is formulated as the "individual contingent threats situation" within the framework of the theory of social situations due to Greenberg (1990). The method of proving the existence also provides us with a step-by-step method of constructing the vN-M stable set.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 30 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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- Iñarra García, María Elena & Larrea Jaurrieta, María Concepción & Saracho de la Torre, Ana Isabel, 2003.
"The Supercore for Normal Form Games,"
2003-04, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
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