Revision of conjectures about the opponent’s utilities in signaling games
AbstractIn this paper we apply the concept of preference conjecture equilibrium introduced in Perea (2003) to signaling games and show its relation to sequential equilibrium. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of minimum revision equilibrium and show how this can be interpreted as a refinement of sequential equilibrium. We also present a method to compute preference conjecture equilibria.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 30 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Schulteis,Tim & Perea,Andres & Peters,Hans & Vermeulen,Dries, 2004. "Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games," Research Memoranda 008, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- Schulteis, Tim & Perea, Andres & Peters, Hans & Vermeulen, Dries, 2007. "Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-12201, Maastricht University.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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