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How does national culture affect corporate risk-taking?

Author

Listed:
  • José María Díez-Esteban

    (University of Burgos)

  • Jorge Bento Farinha

    (University of Porto)

  • Conrado Diego García-Gómez

    (University of Valladolid - Duques de Soria Campus)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyse the effects of national culture and formal institutions on corporate risk-taking. By applying panel data techniques for a sample of large quoted firms from 35 countries over the period of 2007–2014, we document that national culture proxied by Hofstede’s dimensions (power distance, masculinity, individualism, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation) influence corporate risk-taking. We also observe that the characteristics and quality of formal institutions in a country can create an environment that promotes risk-taking when corruption perception and financial freedom levels are high. Finally, cultural heterogeneity among shareholders matters for corporate risk-taking, what may help to implement better corporate governance practises. Our research contributes to the existing literature providing further evidence on the direct and indirect effects of national culture on corporate decision-making.

Suggested Citation

  • José María Díez-Esteban & Jorge Bento Farinha & Conrado Diego García-Gómez, 2019. "How does national culture affect corporate risk-taking?," Eurasian Business Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 9(1), pages 49-68, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:eurasi:v:9:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s40821-018-0105-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s40821-018-0105-0
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    Cited by:

    1. Song, Ciji & Nahm, Abraham Y. & Song, Zengji, 2021. "Entrepreneurs' hobbies and corporate risk taking: Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    2. Julien Hanoteau & Virginie Vial, 2020. "Institutional quality, conforming and evasive entrepreneurship," Eurasian Business Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 10(1), pages 97-121, March.
    3. Sarela Enriquez-Perales & Conrado Diego García-Gómez & José María Díez-Esteban & Edmundo R. Lizarzaburu Bolaños, 2023. "Formal institutions, ICSID arbitration and firm performance: evidence from Latin America," Eurasian Business Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 13(2), pages 429-464, June.
    4. Zhang, Weike & Zhang, Xueyuan & Tian, Xiaoli & Sun, Fengwei, 2021. "Economic policy uncertainty nexus with corporate risk-taking: The role of state ownership and corruption expenditure," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate risk-taking; National culture; Formal institutions quality; Ownership structure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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