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On seller estimates and buyer returns

Author

Listed:
  • Alex Gershkov

    (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mount Scopus
    Economics and Law University of Surrey Guildford)

  • Flavio Toxvaerd

    (University of Cambridge and CEPR)

Abstract

This paper revisits recent empirical research on buyer credulity in arts auctions and auctions for assets in general. We show that elementary results in auction theory can fully account for some stylized facts on asset returns that have been held to suggest that sellers of assets can exploit buyers by providing biased estimates of asset values. We argue that, rather than showing that buyers are credulous, the existing evidence can serve as an indirect test of the rationality assumptions underlying auction theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Alex Gershkov & Flavio Toxvaerd, 2013. "On seller estimates and buyer returns," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(1), pages 47-55, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:etbull:v:1:y:2013:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-013-0008-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s40505-013-0008-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael P. Keane & David E. Runkle, 1998. "Are Financial Analysts' Forecasts of Corporate Profits Rational?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(4), pages 768-805, August.
    2. Gábor Virág, 2013. "First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 129-163, January.
    3. Jianping Mei & Michael Moses, 2005. "Vested Interest and Biased Price Estimates: Evidence from an Auction Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(5), pages 2409-2435, October.
    4. Clare McAndrew & James L Smith & Rex Thompson, 2012. "The impact of reserve prices on the perceived bias of expert appraisals of fine art," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(2), pages 235-252, March.
    5. Calin Valsan & Robert Sproule, 2006. "Hedonic Models and Pre-Auction Estimates: Abstract Art Revisited," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 26(5), pages 1-10.
    6. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    7. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:26:y:2006:i:5:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; Information disclosure; Seller manipulation; Buyer credulity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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