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Spiteful behavior can make everybody better off

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  • Robert Philipowski

    (Universität Bonn)

Abstract

We present examples of symmetric two-player games admitting a unique Nash equilibrium and a unique evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and such that the ESS payoff is strictly higher than the Nash payoff. In this sense, we show that spiteful behavior can make everybody better off.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Philipowski, 2016. "Spiteful behavior can make everybody better off," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 113-116, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:eaiere:v:13:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s40844-016-0035-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s40844-016-0035-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nash equilibrium; Evolutionarily stable strategy; Spiteful behavior;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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