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The Power of None

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  • Neal D. Hulkower
  • John Neatrour

Abstract

Borda with None (BwN) adds the binding option of “None of these candidates,†N , to the Borda Count (BC), differing from a method of Dodgson in the scoring of ties. The method incorporates the benefits of approval voting, which allows a simple yes/no vote on each candidate and avoids the disadvantages of adding N as a binding outcome to plurality voting. We prove that BwN uniquely satisfies five rational properties which can be viewed as potential axioms that provide a theoretical basis for the method. It allows individual voters to express a personal veto over all or part of the slate which could, with sufficient numbers, become a veto by the electorate. The power of none, then, is offering a voice to otherwise disaffected voters. We introduce a metric similar to one used in the Bak–Sneppen Evolutionary model, candidate fitness, a number between 0 and 1, which measures a candidate’s ranking relative to N . We illustrate its evolution with a hypothetical example. We examine courses of action if N is ranked in the first place. Using BwN to accommodate partial voting is proposed. We explore the general applicability of BwN. Finally, we address the practical considerations for introducing BwN.

Suggested Citation

  • Neal D. Hulkower & John Neatrour, 2019. "The Power of None," SAGE Open, , vol. 9(1), pages 21582440198, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:sagope:v:9:y:2019:i:1:p:2158244019837468
    DOI: 10.1177/2158244019837468
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521516051.
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