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Revealed Preference and External Reference

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  • Keith Dowding

    (Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, UK k.m.dowding@lse.ac.uk)

Abstract

Amartya Sen claims that the standard axioms of rational choice theory are not subject to `internal consistency'. That is, in order to discover whether someone behaves inconsistently or irrationally one must look beyond the choice function to the actors' motivations. This is true. Intentional explanations require reference to the environment or context in which choice takes place. However, rather than being inconsistent with standard von Neumann-Morgernstern accounts of utility and with revealed preference analysis, as Sen maintains, such externalist arguments show the standard accounts are necessary for intentional explanation.

Suggested Citation

  • Keith Dowding, 2002. "Revealed Preference and External Reference," Rationality and Society, , vol. 14(3), pages 259-284, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:14:y:2002:i:3:p:259-284
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463102014003001
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Amartya Sen, 1997. "Maximization and the Act of Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 745-780, July.
    2. Gaertner, Wulf & Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1992. "Individual Rights Revisited," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(234), pages 161-177, May.
    3. Sen, Amartya, 1993. "Internal Consistency of Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 495-521, May.
    4. Amartya Sen, 1999. "The Possibility of Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 349-378, June.
    5. Wulf Gaertner & Yongsheng Xu, 1999. "Rationality And External Reference," Rationality and Society, , vol. 11(2), pages 169-185, May.
    6. Baigent, Nick & Gaertner, Wulf, 1996. "Never Choose the Uniquely Largest: A Characterization," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 239-249, August.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Francesco GUALA, 2017. "Preferences: Neither Behavioural nor Mental," Departmental Working Papers 2017-05, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    2. Giovanni Razzu, 2021. "Economics and duty-motivated choices," Economics Discussion Papers em-dp2021-02, Department of Economics, University of Reading.
    3. Lina Eriksson, 2010. "Choice under description: The motivational nexus," Rationality and Society, , vol. 22(2), pages 159-187, May.

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