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Barriers to Entry and Political Competition

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  • Randall G. Holcombe

Abstract

Models of electoral competition tend to focus on competition between parties, but there are more significant alliances among incumbents of different parties than between incumbents and non-incumbents of the same party. The coalition of incumbents uses barriers to entry to place challengers at a competitive disadvantage, which frees incumbents from having to strictly follow the desires of the voters. This enhances the benefits of holding office. Models of political competition that leave out the competition between incumbents and non-incumbents overlook the most significant dimension of political competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Randall G. Holcombe, 1991. "Barriers to Entry and Political Competition," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(2), pages 231-240, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:3:y:1991:i:2:p:231-240
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692891003002007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kalt, Joseph P & Zupan, Mark A, 1984. "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 279-300, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stefano Bartolini, 1999. "Collusion, Competition and Democracy," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(4), pages 435-470, October.

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