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Ideas, Institutions and Political Culture in Western Development

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  • Erich Weede

Abstract

Contemporary Western political culture is characterized by three achievements and ideas: (1) the limitation of government or the rule of law; (2) some institutional separation of the economy and of science from government and religion; and (3) popular participation or democracy. The first two components of Western political culture are prerequisites of the European miracle. In contrast to the great Asian civilizations, Western civilization alone succeeded in overcoming mass poverty. The third component of Western political culture, i.e. democracy, depends on the first two components as well as on a high level of prosperity. Western cultural, political and economic achievements are rooted in political fragmentation, i.e. in the existence of an international system in the West instead of a unified empire, as well as in conflicts between cities and territorial rulers, between secular and spiritual leaders, and later even between crown and parliament. In the twentieth century, however, the most basic Western achievement, i.e. the limitation of government, is threatened by the reassertion and democratization of rent-seeking or creeping socialism. The twin trends towards the growth of distributional coalitions and government reduce Western economic performance without moving us closer to professed egalitarian goals. Western government activities tend to be limited as far as the procurement of public goods is concerned, whether one refers to the maintenance of competition or national security, but increasingly unlimited as far as redistribution is concerned.

Suggested Citation

  • Erich Weede, 1990. "Ideas, Institutions and Political Culture in Western Development," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(4), pages 369-389, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:2:y:1990:i:4:p:369-389
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692890002004002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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