IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jospec/v5y2004i2p213-220.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Principal-Agent Model of Contracting in Major League Baseball

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas J. Miceli

Abstract

Traditional economic analyses of the reserve clause in major league baseball view it as having arisen from the superior bargaining of owners compared to players. This article interprets it instead as promoting efficient investment by teams in player development, given the transferability of player skills to other teams. Using a principal-agent framework, the article shows that limited player mobility emerges as part of the optimal contract between players (principals) and teams (agents).

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas J. Miceli, 2004. "A Principal-Agent Model of Contracting in Major League Baseball," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 5(2), pages 213-220, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:5:y:2004:i:2:p:213-220
    DOI: 10.1177/1527002503257210
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1527002503257210
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/1527002503257210?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Simon Rottenberg, 1956. "The Baseball Players' Labor Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 242-242.
    2. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    3. Craig A. Depken II, 2002. "Free Agency and the Concentration of Player Talent in Major League Baseball," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 3(4), pages 335-353, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Thomas J. Miceli, 2022. "Investing in talent development: Theory and applications," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(6), pages 1641-1650, September.
    2. Pelnar, Gregory, 2007. "Antitrust Analysis of Sports Leagues," MPRA Paper 5382, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Thomas J. Miceli, 2020. "Financing Talent Development: The Baseball Reserve System and the Hollywood Star System," Working papers 2020-22, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Thomas J. Miceli, 2003. "A Principal-Agent Model of Contracting in Major League Baseball," Working papers 2003-01, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    2. T. Dejonghe & W. Van Opstal, 2009. "The Consequences of an Open Labour Market in Separated Product Markets in European Professional Football," Review of Business and Economic Literature, Intersentia, vol. 54(4), pages 489-512, December.
    3. Daniel R. Marburger, 2003. "Does the Assignment of Property Rights Encourage or Discourage Shirking?," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 4(1), pages 19-34, February.
    4. Anthony C. Krautmann & Young Hoon Lee & Kevin Quinn, 2011. "Playoff Uncertainty and Pennant Races," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 12(5), pages 495-514, October.
    5. Rodney Fort, 2005. "The Golden Anniversary of “The Baseball Players’ Labor Marketâ€," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 6(4), pages 347-358, November.
    6. Helmut Dietl & Markus Lang & Johannes Orlowski & Philipp Wegelin, 2023. "The Effect of the Initial Distribution of Labor-Related Property Rights on the Allocative Efficiency of Labor Markets," Working Papers 398, University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW).
    7. Daniel R. Marburger, 2002. "Property Rights and Unilateral Player Transfers in a Multiconference Sports League," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 3(2), pages 122-132, May.
    8. Martin Schmidt, 2011. "Institutional Change and Factor Movement in Major League Baseball: An Examination of the Coase Theorem’s Invariance Principle," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 39(3), pages 187-205, November.
    9. David J. Berri & Martin B. Schmidt & Stacey L. Brook, 2004. "Stars at the Gate," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 5(1), pages 33-50, February.
    10. Stephen Shmanske, 2007. "Book Review: Handbook of Sports Economics Research, edited by John Fizel. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2005. 288 pp," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 8(6), pages 675-677, December.
    11. Allen R. Sanderson & John J. Siegfried, 2006. "Simon Rottenberg and Baseball, Then and Now: A 50th Anniversary Retrospective," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0606, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    12. Jennifer K. Ashcraft & Craig A. Depken, 2020. "The introduction of the reserve clause in Major League Baseball: evidence of its impact on select player salaries during the 1880s," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 14(1), pages 105-128, January.
    13. Geoffrey N Tuck & Athol R Whitten, 2013. "Lead Us Not into Tanktation: A Simulation Modelling Approach to Gain Insights into Incentives for Sporting Teams to Tank," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(11), pages 1-10, November.
    14. Rosen, Sherwin & Sanderson, Allen, 2001. "Labour Markets in Professional Sports," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(469), pages 47-68, February.
    15. Allen R. Sanderson & John J. Siegfried, 2003. "Thinking about Competitive Balance," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 4(4), pages 255-279, November.
    16. Trudo Dejonghe & Wim Van Opstal, 2010. "Competitive balance between national leagues in European football after the Bosman Case," Rivista di Diritto ed Economia dello Sport, Centro di diritto e business dello Sport, vol. 6(2), pages 41-61, Settembre.
    17. Tony Caporale & Trevor Collier, 2015. "Are We Getting Better or Are They Getting Worse? Draft Position, Strength of Schedule, and Competitive Balance in the National Football League," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 291-300, September.
    18. Philip L. Hersch & Jodi E. Pelkowski, 2014. "Does General Manager Networking Affect Choice of Trade Partners in Major League Baseball?," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 15(6), pages 601-616, December.
    19. Trudo Dejonghe & Wim Van Opstal, 2008. "The consequences of an open labour market in a closed product market in the economic environment of European professional football," Working Papers 0830, International Association of Sports Economists;North American Association of Sports Economists.
    20. Martin B. Schmidt, 2021. "The Competitive Returns To The Global Search For Talent: Professional Sports Markets And Foreigners," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(1), pages 396-419, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:5:y:2004:i:2:p:213-220. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.