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Budgetary Clientelism and Decentralization in Hungary and Romania

Author

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  • Sergiu Gherghina

    (Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Glasgow)

  • Clara Volintiru

    (Department of International Business and Economics, Bucharest University of Economic Studies)

Abstract

The literature on clientelism covers the extent to which public budgets are politicized relative to specific groups of supporters. However, we know little about what drives the discretionary transfers from central to local governments. This article addresses this research gap and analyses the causes for such allocations in two East European countries: Hungary and Romania. The analysis draws on an original dataset that includes the transfers from central to local budgets in 2019 and the political affiliation of local governments. Our findings illustrate that the degree of decentralization and the electoral system can explain this type of clientelism.

Suggested Citation

  • Sergiu Gherghina & Clara Volintiru, 2023. "Budgetary Clientelism and Decentralization in Hungary and Romania," Journal of Developing Societies, , vol. 39(1), pages 40-62, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jodeso:v:39:y:2023:i:1:p:40-62
    DOI: 10.1177/0169796X221148509
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    References listed on IDEAS

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