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Hunger to Violence: Explaining the Violent Escalation of Nonviolent Demonstrations

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  • Daniel Gustafson

Abstract

Under what conditions do nonviolent demonstrations escalate to violence? I answer this question using a novel theory of individual impatience in protests that begin peacefully. Rather than considering protest groups as unitary actors, I present a theory of collective action in which a group’s decision over whether or not to engage in anti-government violence is the product of individual preferences. Individuals involved in a nonviolent demonstration use the immediacy of their needs and the sustainability of collective action to decide whether or not to initiate violence against the state. Specifically, I hypothesize that the likelihood of violent escalation will increase when the food price increases and unemployment rate is high or when the event is spontaneous. Analysis of a Bayesian multilevel model of 2,405 nonviolent demonstrations from 1991 to 2017 in Africa and Latin America supports my expectations.

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  • Daniel Gustafson, 2020. "Hunger to Violence: Explaining the Violent Escalation of Nonviolent Demonstrations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 64(6), pages 1121-1145, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:64:y:2020:i:6:p:1121-1145
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002719890669
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher, 2011. "Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede: How Do States Respond to Internally Divided Separatists?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(2), pages 275-297, May.
    3. Ritter, Emily Hencken & Conrad, Courtenay R., 2016. "Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 110(1), pages 85-99, February.
    4. Marc F. Bellemare, 2015. "Rising Food Prices, Food Price Volatility, and Social Unrest," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 97(1), pages 1-21.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alex Dickson & Ian A. MacKenzie & Petros G. Sekeris, 2022. "The role of markets on resource conflicts," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 124(3), pages 677-708, July.

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