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A Test of M1(im) Bargaining Sets in Sidepayment Games

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  • H. Andrew Michener
  • Kenneth Yuen

    (Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin—Madison)

Abstract

This article reports an experimental test of the M 1 (im) Cooperative and M 1 (im) Shapley bargaining set solutions in 3-person superadditive, sidepayment games with nonempty core. The results indicate that, on an overall basis, M 1 (im) Cooperative has greater predictive accuracy than does M 1 (im) Shapley. The data also indicate that M 1 (im) Cooperative is comparatively more accurate in games in which the equality vector located inside the core and in games in which the strength of the 13 coalition is high. These findings are consistent with the view that variations in game properties may affect the salience of different standards of fairness that underlie the M 1 (im) bargaining set.

Suggested Citation

  • H. Andrew Michener & Kenneth Yuen, 1983. "A Test of M1(im) Bargaining Sets in Sidepayment Games," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 27(1), pages 109-135, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:27:y:1983:i:1:p:109-135
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002783027001004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael Maschler, 1963. "The Power of a Coalition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 10(1), pages 8-29, October.
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